

OPERATIONAL COMBAT SERIES

Luzon: Race for Bataan

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Introduction

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines took place in the early days of the Pacific War. The ground war on Luzon Island (the most important island in the Philippines) began on December 10, 1941, with several small landings and continued until the U.S.-Philippine Army retreated to the Bataan Peninsula and finally surrendered on April 7 of the following year. "Luzon: Race for Bataan" is a five turn OCS mini-game that recreates the period of intense maneuvering during the Battle of Luzon, from December 22, when the main Japanese forces landed in Lingayen Gulf, to January 7, 1942, when the

U.S.-Philippine Army completed their retreat to the Bataan Peninsula.

The Japanese landed approximately one division each at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay and planned to pincer and destroy the U.S.-Philippine Army in the vicinity of the capital, Manila. However, MacArthur, commander of the U.S. Army Forces Far East, decided to make Manila an Open City and directed the entire U.S.-Philippine Army to retreat into the excellent defensive terrain available in the Bataan Peninsula. Major General Wainwright, commander of the North Luzon Force, conducted a brilliant retreat against the advancing Japanese blitzkrieg, and succeeded in getting a large number of troops to Bataan.

In "Luzon: Race for Bataan," the U.S.-Philippine Army must delay the Japanese advance and gather forces in the Bataan peninsula. The Japanese priority is to capture Manila as directed by the Imperial General Headquarters, but if the U.S.-Philippine Army is outmaneuvered, they can manage both to occupy Manila and deal a devastating blow to the U.S.-Philippine Army.

This mini-game is a great introduction to the *Operational Combat Series (OCS)*. If you are new to OCS, these rules are not used, so you can skip over them:

- 12.6c Eating off the Map
- 12.7 Extenders
- 12.8e Breakout
- 13.5 Replacement Units
- 13.9 Unit Consolidation
- 14.7d Hip Shoots
- 14.9 Air Transport
- 14.10 Air Drop
- 16.0 Hedgehogs
- 18.0 Naval Power
- 19.0 Ports & Shipping
- 20.0 Breakdowns

Also, Step Loss Markers, Hedgehog Markers, Replacement Units, and Railhead Markers will not be used.

1.0 General Special Rules

1.1 Map & Terrain

There is one map. Hexes are identified by a number, e.g. hex 17.16 is the Major City terrain hex of Manila. The scale of *Luzon* is the OCS standard of 5 miles per hex, and 1/2 week per turn.

1.1a Terrain Effects Chart. The movement/combat effects are explained in the Terrain Effects Chart (TEC), which is printed on the map.

1.1b Hedgehogs. Hedgehogs are not used in *Luzon*.

1.1c Ports. Ports are printed on the map purely for historical interest. They have no gameplay function.

1.1d Points of Interest. A Point of Interest represents a place that is smaller than a Village in OCS terms. In *Luzon*, the Terrain Category Line of a Point of Interest is Close (for Combat and Barrage), but the Terrain Modifier is that of the *other* terrain in the hex, so Armor and Mech units are doubled when attacking if the hex is Open Terrain.

A Point of Interest also functions as a Detrainable Hex on Secondary Roads for the Japanese (see 2.1b).

1.2 Weather

Weather only affects air operations in *Luzon*. Weather is determined each turn by rolling for Flight Conditions (one die). A roll of 3-6 is Normal Flight (no restrictions). A roll of 1-



2 is Limited Flight. During Limited Flight, air missions are allowed only in the Player's Movement Phase. Air Refits are unaffected by weather conditions.

1.3 Air Operations

1.3a Hip Shoots. Neither player may conduct Hip Shoots (*OCS 14.7d*).

1.3b Off-Map Box. The Japanese player has an off-map air box representing airfields in northern Luzon. It may be used to base any number of air units at any given time. Air units refit for no supply cost in the off-map box. No combat or barrage is allowed in this box.

The Northern Luzon Air Box is 25 hexes from any hex along the north map edge.

1.3c Air Strips. There are several Air Bases printed on the map. While these Air Bases had been heavily damaged by the Japanese air campaign prior to game start, each side was able to make use of them for small numbers of aircraft. In OCS terms, they function as Air Strips (*OCS 15.2*).

At game start, place all six of the provided Air Strip Markers on hexes marked with an Air Base with the U.S. color side facing up. They are flipped to their Japanese color side if the hex is captured (*OCS 9.14f*). Air Strips can neither be improved nor destroyed.

1.4 Manila – Open City

MacArthur declared the city of Manila an Open City to spare it wartime destruction. The U.S.-Philippine Army units defending in any of Manila's hexes have their defenses halved and are not subject to the Terrain Effects of Major or Minor City terrain (consider them to be in Open terrain for purposes of combat or barrage). These restrictions do not apply to Japanese units.

1.5 HQ Units

All six HQ units in this game have a parenthesized (defense-only) strength of 2 when in combat mode, and 1 in Move Mode. They are considered 1/2 RE. HQ units do not provide the usual +1 Flak DRM in this game.

Note that all Japanese units are considered independent units for fueling. Japanese HQ units can supply any Japanese unit (The provision of *OCS 13.1d*, that Divisional HQs can only provide supply to their own division's units or to independent units of the same nationality, does not apply in *Luzon*).

1.6 Engineer Functions

HQ and Engineer units can perform engineer functions. Only Bridging and Detrainable Creation are available. Neither army can build or improve Air Bases or Hedgehogs.

Japanese HQ units do not have the ability to create Detrainable Hexes on Secondary Roads (see 2.1b).

1.7 Transport

Neither Army can transport units or SP by rail, air or sea.

Japanese Wagons cannot be captured. If rolled for on the Capture Table (*OCS 9.14c*), captured Wagons are destroyed with their cargo.

1.8 Breakout

Breakout (*OCS 12.8e*) is not available to either side in this game.

1.9 No Eating off the Map

Eating off the Map (*OCS 12.6c*) is not available to either side in this game. Combat units that cannot “make their trace” to a Supply Source are marked Out of Supply and roll for Attrition (*OCS 12.8*).

1.10 Multi-Unit Formations

The trace supply limitation for Multi-Unit Formations (*OCS 12.6f*) does not apply to the Japanese (historically, the 16th Division was committed to both Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay).

1.11 Restricted Hex Entry

The U.S.-Philippine Army units cannot enter Japanese Supply Sources at 7.39 (Agoo), 31.08 (Atimonan), and 21.42 (Bayombong), and the Japanese landing hexes (the hexsides are highlighted black for clarity).

The Japanese player can enter the U.S.-Philippine Supply Sources at any time.

1.12 Armies & Nationalities

The terms Japanese and Axis are used interchangeably. Japanese Army units are pale yellow. The 16th Division's unit stripe is green for its code name “Hedge” and the 48th Division's stripe is blue for its code name “Sea.”

The terms U.S.-Philippine and Allied are used interchangeably. The U.S.-Philippine Army consists of the U.S. Army (green), the Philippine Scouts (teal) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (blue).

1.13 Re-Roll Counter

The Re-Roll counter may be used at any time by the possessing player to re-roll any ONE die roll (Supply, Reinforcement, Flak, Air Combat, Barrage, Surprise or Combat roll), except a player's Initiative roll. Once used, however, it is immediately given to your opponent who may then use it at their discretion. The Re-Roll counter can be held onto as long as a player wishes. It may be passed back and forth any number of times throughout the game. A given die roll may only be re-rolled once (you cannot do a re-roll, hand the counter to your opponent who then tries to re-roll that same die roll a second time).



1.14 Artillery Movement

Artillery units may not voluntarily move adjacent to an enemy Attack Capable unit unless they are stacked with or moving into a hex containing a friendly combat unit that isn't also an artillery unit.

2.0 Japanese Special Rules

2.1 Supply and Reinforcements

2.1a First Turn Supply. Japanese units are automatically in Trace Supply the first turn of the game (22 Dec 1941).

2.1b Japanese Supply Sources. Beginning on Turn 2 (26 Dec 1941), 7.39 (Agoo), 31.08 (Atimonan), and 21.42 (Bayombong) are supply sources. In this game, the Japanese player may use Secondary Roads (not tracks) to trace supply back to a Supply Source exactly like railroads in the *OCS Series Rules*. Villages, Cities and Points of Interest function as “detrainable hexes” for trace supply purposes. Rail lines do not function for Japanese in any way other than their terrain cost for ground movement.

Note that the U.S.-Philippine Army cannot obtain trace supply using Secondary Roads like the Japanese.

2.1c Reinforcements. Japanese units designated as “Turn Two” in the scenario setup are placed in the hex indicated during the Reinforcement Phase of Turn 2. There are no amphibious landings in *Luzon*; simply place arriving units in the designated hex.

2.1d Replacements. Japanese ground units may be rebuilt per the Common Replacement Table. Air units may not be rebuilt. Replacements must be taken immediately, and may not be saved for a later turn.

A rebuilt unit is placed within 2 hexes of Agoo (7.39) if it landed with the IJA northern group or within 2 of Atimonan (31.08) if it landed with the IJA southern group. It may be placed in an EZOC. Rebuilt units may also be placed with the 14th Army HQ or with an HQ matching the unit’s color stripe if applicable.

3.0 U.S.-Philippine Special Rules

3.1 Supply and Reinforcements

3.1a U.S.-Philippine Supply Sources. Supply Sources of the U.S.-Philippine Army are as follows:

17.16 (Manila’s Major City hex) Turns 1-3

9.14 (Mariveles) Turns 3-5

Rail lines on the map can be used by the U.S.-Philippine Army only to draw trace supply. Villages, Cities and Points of Interest (1.1d) function as “detrainable hexes” for supply purposes. There is no Rail Capacity for transport.

Note that the U.S.-Philippine Army cannot draw trace supplies using Secondary Roads like the Japanese.

3.1b Reinforcements. U.S.-Philippine reinforcements are listed in the scenario setup. They are placed in the designated hex during the Reinforcement Phase.

3.1c Combat Unit Recovery. The U.S.-Philippine player uses a Recovery process as follows:

- Ground units destroyed by combat or attrition are placed in the “Recovery Pool.”
- During each Allied player’s Reinforcement Phase, prior to rebuilding via the Replacement table, draw one unit at random from the Recovery Pool. If the Recovery Pool contains 7 or more units, draw two at random.
- Place all remaining Recovery Pool units into the Dead Pile. They are immediately available for rebuilding.
- Recovered units are placed on the map (even in an EZOC) in these locations:
 - Within 2 hexes of any city hex of Manila (unless all Manila hexes are currently controlled by the Japanese).
 - Within 2 hexes of 10.17 (Balanga), even if Balanga is occupied by an enemy unit).
- Air units go directly to the Dead Pile.

Design Note: Losses incurred on the OCS Combat Result Table are a bit excessive for the U.S.-Philippine Army. Soldiers of Philippine Army units defeated in battle during this period often regrouped and rejoined the front line.

3.1d Replacements. U.S.-Philippine Ground units may be rebuilt per the Common Replacement Table. Air units may not be rebuilt. Replacements may not be saved for a later turn.

After the Recovery process, the U.S.-Philippine player may rebuild any one unit from the Dead Pile on a roll of 8 or higher with 2D6. The rebuilt unit is placed on the map in the same way as Recovered units.

3.2 Limited Strat Move

No more than 2 Allied units may be in Strat Mode at the end of the Allied Movement Phase.

4.0 Optional Rules

Series Optional Rules.

Supply Caches (*OCS 21.10*) are not used in this game. The three Series Optional Rules that might apply are Long Range Air (*OCS 21.4*), Attacking Empties (*OCS 21.8*), and Reactive Artillery (*OCS 21.9*). Independents (*OCS 21.3*) and Convention Tempo (*OCS 21.6*) don’t work with the game scale of Luzon.

Luzon Optional Variations.

There are two ways to use these options. One is a play balance mechanism, for players to adjust if you find that one side seems to win games more than the other. The second is to add more variety to the game by having each player roll one or two changes at random.

Options favoring the Japanese player (roll 1D6 to select):

1. Japanese alternative setup: move the 6-4-4 Inf Rgt (9-16) from the Uejima Detached

Force (6.42) to the 31.08 (Altimonan) landing in the Turn Two Group and move the 5-4-3 Inf Rgt (2 For/48) one hex south to start in 6.42.

2. Add the 1-3-3 Eng Bn (3 Eng, 6 Eng) to the Second Group landing in Agoo (7.39).
3. Add the 6-2-4 Arty Bn (9H) to the Turn Two Group landing in Agoo (7.39).
4. Remove the Allied 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (42-41) which starts in 13.07.
5. The Lily and MixB Japanese bombers begin the game at full strength.
6. Add +1 to Japanese replacement rolls.

Options favoring the Allied player (roll 2D6 to select):

2. Allow Allied units to enter Japanese landing hexes. If his units are in a Japanese Turn Two Group hex when those units are placed, the Allied player must displace them to the next empty road hex in the direction of Manila.
3. Reduce any two on-map supply dumps by 1 SP each at start and add 2 SP in Mariveles (9.14). This reflects an earlier emphasis on positioning supplies in Bataan.
4. The Terrain Modifier for Point-of-Interest hexes is the same as Hills terrain for Combat and Barrage (Armor and Mech are not doubled). Route 7 (12.21 to 8.19) is a track instead of a secondary road.
5. The two Allied tank units (3-3-6 Armor Bn (192, 194)) are 12 MA on their Move Mode side instead of 10.
6. Move the 3-0-3 (11/11) one hex north to setup in Bayambang (8.32). Move the 3-1-3 (22/21) one hex north to setup in Lingayen (5.35).
7. The Allied player may have as many units under his 2 Strat Mode markers at the end of movement as he wishes. There can be no more than 2 stacks containing Strat Mode markers, but he is not restricted to a maximum of 2 units.
8. Increase the American Mixed fighter unit to full strength at start.
9. The Allied player may place Interdiction markers in three different hexes each turn, within two hexes of an Allied unit at either the start of his movement phase or the end of his movement phase. Roll a 1D6 in the

subsequent Air and Naval Barrage Segment for each marker, which is ONLY active on a die roll of 5-6 (remove the marker immediately on a roll of 1-4). This represents bridge-blowing and other demolition activities. You will need to use some of the Japanese Interdiction markers.

10. The Japanese Turn Two Group at Agoo (7.39) is reduced to 12 SP instead of 15 SP.
11. Add the 5-1-3 Arty Bn (23-Phil) as a reinforcement on 1 Jan 42.
12. Add +1 to all Replacement rolls for both players.

5.0 Victory Conditions

Japanese Sudden Death Win.

If the Japanese occupy 17.16 (the Manila Major City hex) during the Clean-Up Phase of the 29 Dec 41 turn (Turn 3) with an Attack-Capable unit (which does not have to be in Trace Supply) they win the game immediately.

Japanese Win.

The Japanese must achieve two objectives to win. At the end of the 5 Jan 1942 turn (Turn 5) they must:

1. Have a Japanese unit occupy a hex south of the "Japan Victory Line" (marked on the map at hexes 6.16 to 9.18, this unit does not have to be in trace supply) and,
2. Occupy all three city hexes of Manila with at least 4 RE of Ground units that include Attack Capable units with 10 or more combat strength when in Combat Mode. The units are not required to be in Combat Mode. (Garrisoning Manila before this point is not required.)

Allied Win.

The U.S.-Philippine player wins if no Japanese units in trace supply occupy a hex on the map southwest of the "U.S.-Philippine Victory Line" (marked on the map at hexes 5.20 to 9.19) at the end of the 5 Jan 1942 turn (Turn 5).

Draw.

If neither victory condition is met, the game is a draw. This was the historical conclusion, as the Japanese captured Dinalupihan (8.19) the evening of 6 Jan and Hermosa (9.19) the morning of 7 Jan 1942 before halting their offensive. You must outperform your historical counterpart to win the game.

6.0 Setup

General Information

First Turn: 22 Dec 1941

Last Turn: 5 Jan 1942

Total Game Length: 5 turns

First Player: Japanese

Setup Order: Allies first

Weather: Roll a die to determine the weather for the first turn.

Special Scenario Rules

- The Japanese player is First Player on Turn 1 (22 Dec 1941), and automatically wins the initiative on Turn 2 (26 Dec 1941).
- Landing unit boxes are placed at the Japanese landing points, but these are only present to facilitate play. The units are present in the designated hexes. There is no process for Amphibious Landing.
- Units and SPs in the "Turn Two Group" in Lingayen Gulf are placed at 7.39 (Agoo) as reinforcements for Turn 2. The transport wagons in this Turn Two Group start the turn empty.
- The Turn Two Group at Lamon Bay is placed at 31.08 (Atimonan), the same as the main force (Main Force) of Turn 1, as reinforcements for Turn 2.

Allied Set-Up Information (*this is also printed on the map*)

Reserve Markers Available: 0

Dead Pile: None

Reinforcements: Per Order of Arrival at end of Allied setup

Variable Repls: Per Allied Order of Arrival

7.42 (Naguilian Field):

2-0-3 Inf Rgt (12-11) in Move Mode

10.40 (Baguio):

2-0-3 Inf Rgt (71-71) in Move Mode

2T	20-1-4 Arty Rgt (86)	Variable Repls: Per Repl Table.
9.38 (Rosario): 2-4-4 Cav Rgt (26) in Move Mode	13.07 (Balayan): 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (42-41)	Re-Roll Counter: Starts with the Japanese Player.
10.35 (Binalonan): 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (72-71) in Move Mode	22.07 (Tiaong): 1-0-3 Inf Rgt (53-51)	6.43: 5-4-3 Inf Rgt (2 For-48)
7.36: 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (23-21)	28.07: 2-0-3 Inf Rgt (51-51) in Move Mode 2-1-3 Inf Rgt (52-51) in Move Mode	6.42 (Uejima Detached Force Box): 6-4-4 Inf Rgt (9-16) 1 SP
5.34 (Aguilar): 3-1-3 Inf Rgt (22-21)	Place Air Strip Markers in the following hexes: 7.42 (Naguilian Field) 11.33 (Carmen Field) 1.26 (Iba Field) 10.24 (Clark Field) 10.15 (Limay Field) 17.15 (Nichols Field)	6.40 (Left Wing Force Box): 48th Div HQ 6-4-3 Inf Rgt (1 For-48) 2 SP
7.34 (San Carlos): 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (21-21)	At any Air Strip: MixF* “*” = the unit begins reduced	6.39 (Right Wing Force Box): 6-5-3 Inf Rgt (47-48) 2-4-6 Recon Bn (48-48) 3-3-4 Tank Bn (4) 2 SP
13.35 (Tayug): 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (91-91)	Allied Order of Arrival 26 Dec 2x Reserve Marker	7.39 (Turn Two Group): 3-3-3 Tank Bn (7) 12-2-4 Arty Rgt (48-48) 18-2-4 Arty Rgt (1H) 10-2-4 Arty Rgt (8H) (1)-3-6 Eng Bn (48-48) 14th Army HQ 15 SP 2 Wagon Points
11.33 (Carmen): 2-0-3 Inf Rgt (13-11)	9.14 (Mariveles): 1 SP	31.08 (Main Force): 2-4-6 Recon Bn (16-16) 1 SP
8.31: 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (11-11)	29 Dec 9.14 (Mariveles): 1 SP	31.08 (Turn Two Group): 16th Div HQ 5-4-3 Inf Rgt (20-16) 12-2-3 Arty Rgt (22-16) (1)-3-3 Eng Bn (16-16) 3 SP
11.28 (Tarlac): NLF HQ 3-0-3 Inf Rgt (92-91) 2 SP	1 Jan 10.17 (Balanga), within 2 hexes: 3-2-3 Inf Rgt (31-Phil)	
16.27 (Cabanatuan): 2 SP	9.14 (Mariveles): 1 SP	
9.24 (Fort Stotsenburg): 3-3-6 Tank Bn (192) 2 SP	5 Jan 9.14 (Mariveles): 1 SP	At North Luzon Airfields holding box: Nate Lily* Ann* MixB* “*” = the units begin reduced
17.16 (Manila): Reserve HQ 1-2-3 Inf Bn (3-43 Phil) 12-1-4 Arty Rgt (88) 2 SP	Japanese Set-Up Information (<i>this is also printed on the map</i>) Reserve Markers Available: 3 Dead Pile: None Reinforcements: Units noted as the Turn Two Group are reinforcements for the second turn. No other reinforcements are available.	
20.10 (Los Banos): 2 SP		
25.10 (Lucban): 4-2-3 Inf Rgt (1-1) in Move Mode		
19.09 (Santo Tomas): SLF HQ 3-3-6 Tank Bn (194)		
16.09 (Tagaytay):		

Designer Notes

By *Matsuura Yutaka*

We wanted to increase the number of OCS players in Japan, so for a while now we've been thinking about the possibility of making our own OCS game that features Japanese troops on the battlefield (and preferably for beginners). We looked at battles in Nomonhan (Khalkhin Gol) and Okinawa, but the scope of the battlefield was too small for the OCS scale, so we shelved the concept.

However, at one point, someone came up with the idea of what the Battle of Luzon in the early days of the Pacific War would look like. When I looked into it, it seemed to me that the main part of Luzon would fit into approximately one full map, and six to nine turns in duration, which would be perfect for beginners. So, I decided to give it a try and produce a playtest concept game.

When I researched the historical facts in detail, the first landing on Luzon Island was on 10 December 1941, but these were quite small units and there was no major conflict for two weeks. The full-scale landing started on 22 December. After that, there was a lot of maneuvering and fierce battles, and the battle near the entrance of the Bataan peninsula lasted until 7 January of the following year. After that, the battle on Bataan was a narrow and prolonged battle, and I decided to cut it out.

Then I could see it taking the form of a 5-turn game on the OCS standard scale, from December 22 to January 7. That's a pretty ideal number of turns for an entry-level game. Moreover, as I was working on the map, I realized that what I initially thought of as one full map could be cut out as one quarter map for the Central Luzon Plain and one quarter map for the southeastern part of Luzon, which could be made in about half a map in effect.

At first, I was thinking of setting the scale of the game at battalion-sized units instead of regiments. There are four historical landing points in Lingayen Gulf and three in Lamon Bay, and if I'm going to assign troops to each landing point, a battalion-sized unit is just the right thing to do. The Japanese units in

OCS "Burma II" are battalions, and I thought that would be possible within the framework of the existing OCS. However, when I actually created and set a game up at this scale, it seemed to me that this number of units was too many for an entry-level player, and that it wasn't going to work well as a game.

For this reason, I decided to redo the units based on regimental scale. With this change, you can't recreate a landing point where only one battalion landed historically, especially in Lamon Bay, so you'd have to reduce the number of landing points from three to one. However, I thought this would be a necessary and reasonable truncation for the game.

Historically, it seems that once the soldiers of the Philippine Army Division were defeated at the front, they often regrouped in the rear and rejoined the line of battle. Therefore, I adopted the recovery concept from *Reluctant Enemies*, where a percentage of units reappear after loss. The recovered units were initially placed in the vicinity of the HQ Units, but that would have prevented the Japanese from advancing. Now we have them arrive at the Allied Supply Sources, and it seems to me that it works well.

Several units were particularly elusive when we tried to establish reliable ratings. Artillery units are difficult to find in source material, and their Barrage Strength and MP in particular, are educated guesses. There simply is not a lot of material to refer to. Subsequent research may prompt an update to them.

Omitting units

During the campaign, more U.S.-Philippine Army units existed in the game map area than we chose to depict as counters. For example, the 31st Division was in the northwestern part of Luzon around Iba, the Philippine Division in Manila, the 41st Division in the southwestern part of Luzon, and the 4th Marine Regiment within the Bataan Peninsula. However, those units retreated into the Bataan peninsula early in the game's duration to conduct preparatory activities for future resistance within the peninsula. As such, the units were not fighting the Japanese before mid-February 1942, so they have been omitted.

Four islands, including Corregidor Island, were also equipped with powerful gun emplacements, which could bombard ships entering Manila Bay, making the port of Manila unusable even after the Japanese occupation. These batteries and the fortifications on Corregidor Island, as well as numerous coastal artillery and anti-aircraft artillery units, are also omitted as they are outside the scope of this game's treatment.

Supply Dumps

Before the war began, the U.S.-Philippine Army had accumulated supplies at Tarlac, Los Banos, Guagua, etc., with the assumption that they would drive the Japanese forces into the sea. In addition, large amounts of supplies at Cabanatuan and Fort Stotsenberg were not destroyed or moved and ended up in the hands of the enemy (In Los Banos, they managed to destroy it all in the nick of time.). The game has 2 SP set up in each of those locations, but given the historical circumstances, perhaps the number of SP set up should be larger. However, I chose to set the present levels to reduce counter clutter for convenience of play. Also, since the supplies accumulated in Guagua were moved inside the Bataan peninsula after the Japanese landed in Lingayen Gulf, the setup did not place SPs in Guagua.

Other notes

1) The reconnaissance battalions of the Japanese 48th and 16th Divisions have "other" combat types (not yellow or red). This is intentional. The Japanese reconnaissance battalion was simply an addition to the original reconnaissance battalion with cars and other equipment. They did not have armored vehicles like the German and other reconnaissance battalions. So, we estimated that they did not have the effect of doubling their offensive power on open terrain.

2) The Japanese tank units are as "Lt"; the Type 89 medium tank was essentially a light tank, although it was designated as a medium tank. The reason why the US M3 Stuart unit is marked as armor (yellow) is to express its superiority over the Japanese tank unit, but by European standards, the M3 would also be "Lt." I would like to leave it up to your judgment to re-evaluate that part of the story.

3) The only livery I could find for the Japanese aircraft was the Nate's paintwork for December 1941. I didn't find the livery of the other models, so all of them are from the Nate. However, the paintwork may have been different for all but the Nate. The U.S. Army MixF is a silhouette of the P-40, but I could not find any documentation of its paint pattern.

4) You may not need to include the 14th Army HQ Unit or the Reserve Force HQ Unit. However, I've included these two commands so that players might use the tactic of aiming to destroy the command units, and I've included them as a backup HQ in case that happens. Also, there have been cases in other OCS games where divisional HQs have a combat mode defense strength of 2, but in this game, corps and Army HQs are also set to 1/2 RE with 2 combat strength. This is because in the case of the U.S. Army, it is considered too strong for the HQs to have a 5 combat strength during a battle at the base of the Bataan Peninsula. In the case of the Japanese, it is because 1 RE each is too large to meet the number of REs required to be left at Manila at the end of turn 5. In fact, these HQs on this battlefield would have been far smaller than those on the European front.

5) The reason the 9-16 regiment's mobility is 4 in combat mode and 6 in movement mode is because it contained some bicycle units.

6) This game has a maximum movement allowance of 10 in movement mode. Initially, some units had a maximum of 18 movement allowance according to the standards of other OCS games, but during playtesting in Japan, playtesters said that in a mini-game like this, a large movement allowance could destroy the enemy's rear HQ units or enter a supply source hex and break the game, so I decided to set the maximum amount of movement allowed at 10.

7) The following Allied units are listed in the order of battle, but I couldn't find any documentation for their actual participation in combat:

3rd Battalion, 43rd Infantry Regiment (3-43)

23rd Artillery Battalion (23)

88th Artillery Battalion (88)

At one time I treated these units as optional. In the latest version, two are added to the setup and the 23rd Artillery is optional. If the Allied side is too strong, it might be a good idea to remove these units from the setup first.

Historical Commentary

By Matsuura Yutaka


U.S. Army Forces Far East

Douglas MacArthur, the youngest-ever Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, retired in 1937. Philippine President Manuel Quezon asked MacArthur to supervise the creation of their army. In addition to his spectacularly distinguished military career, he had an uncommon attachment to the Philippines. MacArthur's father had fought in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War, and he served in the country on multiple occasions. MacArthur was not only a military adviser, he continued to be a vocal advocate for the importance of the Philippines to American authorities (MacArthur had argued that Luzon Island should be given a higher priority for support than the British Isles).

MacArthur, who became a military advisor, was tasked with giving the Philippines, which was scheduled to become independent in 1946, an adequate defense force.

One existing unit was the Philippine Scouts, which had been founded in 1901, shortly after the Philippines became an American territory. Serving in the U.S. Army Bureau of the Philippines, the soldiers were Filipino and Filipino-American, commanded by a white American officer. The equipment was made in the United States and the stipend was paid by the U.S. government. The Philippine Division, organized in the 1920s, was centered on this Philippine Scout troop, and MacArthur was its founding commander. The Philippine Division contained the 31st Infantry Regiment, which was made up entirely of Americans. There were also other independent Philippine Scout units besides the Philippine Division, among them the 26th Independent Cavalry Regiment, which would fight very tenaciously in the retreat to the Bataan Peninsula.

A different approach to creating a military was used when the 1st Regular Division was formed in 1936. It was a key unit of the Philippine Army by the Filipinos after independence, and it began to train soldiers who had been Philippine police officers as the core, with additional soldiers being added gradually.



26th Cavalry moving into Pozorrubio (hex 9.37) past an M3 General Stuart light tank.

MacArthur also decided to recruit civilians to undergo five and a half months of training as reservists to be called up for wartime service. The first 20,000 men began training on January 1, 1937, and the second 20,000 assembled on July 1. Thus, by the end of 1939, there were 4,800 officers and 104,000 soldiers enrolled in the reserve of the Philippine Army, and a substantial number of reserve divisions with a capacity of 7,500 men could be formed if necessary.

Then, in July 1941, when the actual danger of war with Japan was approaching, the U.S. Far Eastern Army was formed and the U.S. and Philippine armies were united, and MacArthur was appointed its commander. MacArthur ordered ten Philippine military reserve divisions to be called up.

Each reserve division was designated with a "1" at the end of its number (11th, 21st, 31st and so on). The first regiment of each division began to be called up on 1 September 1941, the second regiment began to be called up in November, and the third regiment was scheduled to complete its call up on 15 December to begin retraining. The mobilization was not yet complete when the war in the Pacific began.

The condition of these reserve divisions was very bad. From the first training session, the American officers had great anxiety, the biggest problem being the language barrier. The conscripts spoke eight languages, eighty-seven dialects, and few of them could understand the English of the American military advisers. Many of the soldiers had forgotten the five and a half months of training they had received previously. They were also poorly equipped. Most of the soldiers wore the cheap shoes that had been assigned to them, were forced to wear old, faded, ill-fitting blue denim tops and bottoms, and wore grass-stalk hats because they couldn't get a helmet. The badly outdated rifles were too large for most smaller-framed Filipinos, were prone to break, and if they did, there was no replacement. Even when it came to retraining, the training equipment and ammunition were extremely low, and many Filipino soldiers were deployed to the battlefield without ever firing a single live rifle round in training.

Meanwhile, the 192nd and 194th Tank Battalions of the Army National Guard were hurriedly sent to the Philippines from the U.S. mainland. These were equipped with M3 Stuart light tanks. While these were superior to the Japanese tanks, some of the armored vehicles in the equipment only recently reached Luzon. By the end of November, a third of the "tank crews" had never been inside a tank.

War Plan Orange (WPO-3)

The U.S. War Plan Orange, or WPO for short, had been revised several times before the conflict actually began. Anticipating a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the plan was to retreat the line of defense to the Bataan peninsula and hold it by the Bataan peninsula and Fort Corregidor for six months, during which time relief troops would arrive from the home country of the United States.

In fact, the strategy of hunkering down on the Bataan Peninsula seemed to work. MacArthur's father fought the guerrillas holed up on the Bataan Peninsula during the Philippine-American War. Not only that, but as a young man, MacArthur had personally walked the corners of the Bataan peninsula and mapped out its defense plan on orders from his assignment in the Philippines. (Interesting fact: MacArthur's father won the Congressional Medal of Honor in the American Civil War and MacArthur won it in World War 2, making them the first father and son to be awarded the country's highest award for valor.)

MacArthur, however, did not like the proposed strategy for WPO-3. Possessing a naturally aggressive nature, he regarded WPO-3 as too passive. MacArthur believed he both could and should keep Japanese troops from capturing the Philippines. Even if the Japanese landed in April 1942 (MacArthur believed that a Japanese invasion was unlikely until this time of year, when the monsoon was over) he had assured U.S. Army Chief Marshall that he would be ready to stop the enemy's landings.

Many in the U.S. Army and Navy thought the Philippines were indefensible, but MacArthur's confident attitude influenced Chief of Staff George Marshall to believe that the Philippines could be held. It was also

important to have Philippine air bases for the B-17 bombers, which were very advanced for their time. Major General Jonathan Wainwright, commander of the Philippine Division at the time, believed, like MacArthur, that WPO-3 was too defeatist a strategic proposal. Major General Wainwright was a humble but very brave soldier and said, "Defense must be active, not passive! The defense must include a counterattack...." and he was rigorous in training the Philippine Division about offensive combat. Major General Wainwright's father had fought in the Philippines and was killed in 1902, and Wainwright himself had served in the Philippines between 1908 and 1910. He commanded primarily cavalry units until 1940, when he was assigned to the Philippines. Always on the front lines and in command, Wainwright was highly respected by his soldiers.

MacArthur had ordered officers in U.S. Army Forces Far East that the coastline "must be adhered to at all costs." In other words, "the landing force must be attacked and driven off into the sea." As a result, the location of the supply depot was to be changed in late November. WPO-3 was supposed to collect supplies within the Bataan peninsula in preparation for the war, but it was moved to the central plains of Luzon and other areas closer to the coastline where enemy landings were expected.

In addition, on December 3, MacArthur appointed Major General Wainwright as commander of the North Luzon Force, which defended all northern Luzon Island. Under the command of the North Luzon Force, four Philippine reserve divisions and the 26th Cavalry Regiment and others were placed. The South Luzon Force, commanded by Brigadier General George Parker (although he was replaced by Brigadier General Albert Jones at the time of the actual battle), comprised two Philippine Reserve divisions and others that defended the entire southern part of Luzon. In addition, a Reserve Force under MacArthur's direct control was placed in and around Manila, under the direction of the Philippine Division and the 91st Division of the Philippine Army.



Bicycle-mounted Japanese troops on Luzon, December 1941.

Proposal for the Japanese Invasion of the Philippines

Meanwhile, on the Japanese side, when the Japanese were planning their strategy for the Philippines, there was an exchange of ideas about the possibility of the U.S.-Philippine Force withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. It was during the Southern Operations Military Game Exercise at the Army War College in early October 1941. Major General Maeda Masami, who was to be appointed Chief of Staff of the 14th Army, which would be responsible for the Philippines, asked the Imperial General Headquarters, "In light of the example of the Spanish-American (US-Philippine) War, there is a probability that the U.S.-Philippine Force will evacuate to the Bataan Peninsula. How do you think about operations in that case?"

In response to this, the Southern Expeditionary Army said, "If the U.S.-Philippine Force evacuate to Bataan during the course of the operation, we would like them to deal with it slowly as a post-conflict operation after the capture of Manila. Anyway, from a political and strategic point of view, we must capture Manila as soon as possible," and in the end, it was decided that the first priority would be the capture of Manila.

Ultimately, the Japanese plan for the Philippine campaign was based on the premise that the U.S.-Philippine Force

would attempt to defend Manila, with Japanese forces landing from Lingayen and Lamon Bays, aiming to surround and destroy the U.S.-Philippine Force in and around Manila.

This fit with Japanese Army strategic doctrine, which had always asserted that it was important for the capital to fall to deliver both a political and military victory.

It was Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu, who was appointed as the commander of the 14th Army, who took overall command of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Homma was a well-educated man who had served as a military officer in England and was opposed to the war against Britain and the United States. But this background and philosophy were completely sidelined in the Japanese Army, and he was considered a "coward" by those around him because of his gentle and compassionate nature, regarded as "unsuitable" for a military man. The fact that MacArthur was confident in the defense of the Philippines while Homma was very cautious is a great contrast. Homma was the type of commander who made careful, deliberate decisions after thoughtful consideration, and his operational planning ability was highly regarded, but conversely, he was also criticized for being too cautious. On the other hand, the commander of the 48th Division, which was the mainstay of the 14th Army, was Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi

Yuitsu, considered to be a pushy man, because General Staff Office wanted a man who was proactive and agile. Tsuchihashi was familiar with European warfare, having served as a military officer attached to the French Embassy, and was also opposed to the war against Britain and the United States.

14th Army

The Japanese Army could not afford to divert a large force from the ongoing Sino-Japanese War. Thus, the striking power of the 14th Army assigned to the Philippine campaign was only two divisions and a few independent units. The Battle of the Philippine Islands was something of a sideshow, as emphasis was on the Battle of the Malay Peninsula in the Southern Operation.

Moreover, the 48th Division, the mainstay of the division, was to be diverted to the Battle of Java soon after the Philippine Invasion. The 48th Division was one of the first three divisions to be reorganized into a mechanized (motorized infantry) division by the Japanese Army in the spring of 1941. Although it was the best "motorized" unit in the Japanese Army, in fact its units were one-third motorized, one-third on bicycles and one-third on foot, and its mobility was greatly inferior to that of the motorized infantry divisions of the Western powers. Moreover, since this was the first time it tried to march and fight by car, there were still many deficiencies in its operation.

However, the 47th Infantry Regiment was a veteran unit composed of men from Kyushu who were veterans of the fighting in China. The 1st and 2nd Formosa Infantry Regiments had also seen combat on the mainland China many times.


Another division, the 16th Division, had also seen military service in Manchuria between 1937 and 1939. The main body of the 16th Division was to land in Lamon Bay on 24 December, but its deployment was fragmented into two operations: one regiment in Legazpi ahead of it, and one in Lingayen Gulf with the 48th Division.

In addition, there were independent units, such as independent Artillery Units, as well as the 4th and 7th Tank Regiments (represented as OCS battalions due to their

size). The 4th Tank Regiment was equipped with Type 95 Light Tanks and the 7th Tank Regiment with Type 89 Medium Tanks. Filipino soldiers in combat sometimes ran away at the mere sight of these tanks, but they were inferior in performance to the US Army's M3 Stuart Light Tanks.

Outbreak of War (8-21 Dec 1941)

The news of the attack on Pearl Harbor came to the upper echelons of the U.S.-Philippine Army, including MacArthur, shortly after 3:00 a.m. local time on December 8 in the Philippines. On the Japanese side, Japanese Navy planes from Taiwan were scheduled to bomb air bases in the Philippines on the same day as the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the launch was delayed due to the time difference and bad weather. The Japanese were jittery that every defensive measure would have been taken by the time the bombers reached the Philippines. The Air Force commander on the U.S.-Philippine Army side tried to ask MacArthur for permission to preemptively bomb the Japanese air base in Taiwan with B-17 bombers stationed in the Philippines. But it seemed as if every possible cog in the wheel of fate - and the much-disputed inadequacy of MacArthur - continued to turn in the worst way for the U.S.-Philippine Army. The result was that the majority of the B-17 bombers and P-40 fighters at Clark Field, the largest air base in the Philippines, and other locations, were destroyed in just one day!



General Wainwright and General MacArthur in the Philippines.

Two days later, the U.S. Navy's Cavite base in Manila Bay was also devastated by an air strike, and the Royal Navy's Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk off the coast of Malaysia. Most of the naval and air forces needed to prevent the Japanese Army from attacking the southern part of the country were quickly lost. But when MacArthur finally came out of his stupor, he was as confident and unfazed as he had ever been. To the American public, which had been frustrated by a series of humiliating defeats, MacArthur quickly became a symbol of all-out resistance. MacArthur was urging the home country to send reinforcements so vigorously that he thought the Philippines could still be defended if only they were delivered. But President Roosevelt had decided on December 12 to prioritize the war on Germany before Japan, and the U.S. concluded that it would have to abandon the Philippines.

The equivalent of one regiment of the 48th Division landed at Aparri and Bigan in northern Luzon on 10 December, and the equivalent of one regiment of the 16th Division landed at Legazpi in southeastern Luzon on 12 December. MacArthur correctly analyzed that these small landings on the edge of Luzon were a diversion to disperse the U.S.-Philippine Forces. Since he expected the main Japanese forces would likely be landing in Lingayen Gulf, the U.S.-Philippine Force should not disperse their forces either (On the Japanese side, they also

occupied a U.S.-Philippine airfield located in the northern part of Luzon for their own use because of the short range of the Army aircraft). He also began to tell the war correspondents that our troops could not "return fire to the enemy on every coastline." By this time, he told those around him that if the Japanese landed with a strong force, we might concentrate our forces on the Bataan Peninsula and evacuate the HQ of the U.S. Army Forces Far East and the Philippine government to Corregidor Island. MacArthur's reasoning had judged everything correctly.

But MacArthur still seemed emotionally hesitant. There was no order to move the large quantities of supplies that had been placed near the front to the Bataan

peninsula, nor was there any change at all in the order to drive the enemy to the sea, and the U.S.-Philippine Force were already moving toward the points where small units of the enemy had landed and were moving southward or where they were expected to land. Perhaps MacArthur, who despised WPO-3 as nothing more than "by the book" and "defeatist," couldn't bring himself to invoke it until he had no choice but to do so. In this situation, early in the morning of December 22, the main Japanese troops finally began to land in Lingayen Gulf.

Lingayen Gulf (22 - 23 Dec)

When the Japanese forces landed in the Gulf of Lingayen, they avoided the southern shore of the bay where the enemy was expecting them to land and deployed the majority of the Philippine troops. As their main objective was to ensure the landing, they selected the landing points in the mountains on the eastern shore of the bay. At this time, the landing points extended further south than planned because of the darkness, and this was a factor in the smooth progress of the operation after landing.

The landing force routed Philippine troops at Bauang (6.42) and won a battle against the 26th Philippine Scout Independent Cavalry Regiment in the vicinity of Rosario (9.38). The following day, on the 23rd, they advanced to the front of Binalonan (10.35) and extended a bridgehead immediately after the landing. The 2nd Formosa Infantry Regiment, which had landed at Aparri and Vigan in northern Luzon on the 10th, also joined in. But the landing operations were far behind schedule, and the tank and artillery units had not yet unloaded.

In the first place, there was a great debate at the 14th Army's strategy meeting in late November about what to do after controlling the bottleneck south of Rosario. The 14th Army, fearing a counterattack by the strongest Philippine Division on the U.S.-Philippine side, believed that they should be halted until the heavy artillery and tank units could be fully lifted. The 48th Division, however, felt that it should move forward aggressively to secure the crossing point of the Agno River, even at some risk. At the time of the operations meeting, no conclusions had been reached, and on the

night of the 23rd, the Chief of Operations of the 14th Army came in and told them to refrain from the rush, but the Chief of Staff of the 48th Division did not agree.

On the other hand, Major General Wainwright, commander of the Northern Luzon Corps, who was in command on the front lines, thought that although the Japanese had been allowed to advance south of Rosario during the battles of the 22nd and 23rd, the 26th Cavalry Regiment had done an excellent job of buying time for the Philippine troops to retreat, and that it was still possible to repel the Japanese if MacArthur allowed the Philippine Division to join the battle. But when MacArthur learned of the Japanese advance and the withdrawal of Philippine troops, he apparently realized that his previous aggressive measures were no longer possible.

Wainwright called MacArthur on the afternoon of the 23rd and asked permission for a retreat to the Agno River. MacArthur immediately approved. Wainwright also appealed for permission to use the Philippine Division because it could counterattack from the Agno River line if it could be used. After a short silence, MacArthur responded, "It's highly improbable." MacArthur's decision to send the Philippine Division to the Bataan Peninsula at this stage was wise in hindsight—but extremely frustrating to commanders at the front. That evening, more calls from MacArthur's chief of staff came to Wainwright, who still hadn't given up on his counterattack plan. Wainwright was told that, "WPO-3 is in effect." In other words, it was an order to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula. But that wasn't the only thing. The chief of staff added, "General MacArthur intends to evacuate Manila and move his headquarters to Fort Corregidor." Wainwright firmly believed that a soldier should be on the battlefield instead of far behind the lines at a remote headquarters.

Lamon Bay (24 Dec)

Meanwhile, in Lamon Bay southeast of Manila, the 16th Division also began to land early in the morning of the 24th. The Japanese plan, originally drawn up in November, called for the 16th Division to land farther west in Batangas Bay. There was a more suitable coast there, and the route to



Type 89B medium tank of Col. Seinosuke Sonoda's 7th Tank Regiment is seen here crossing an improvised bridge erected to bypass Highway 6 north of Manila on 3 January 1942 during the fighting in the Philippines. This company used a white star as its unit insignia.

Manila was shorter and had more open terrain. However, the landings in Batangas Bay were changed to Lamon Bay, as it was believed that the landing operation was becoming more dangerous with the reinforcement of American bombers and submarines.

Lamon Bay was not very suitable for landing operations due to its strong winds. Reaching Manila required advancing units to pass along the Tayabas Mountains. The road was also too narrow to move a large army, so the landing force had to be divided into three smaller units (the game scale is too large to replicate these three landing points in this game, so I've narrowed it down to one main landing point). In view of these difficulties and the 16th Division's poor combat record in China, Lieutenant General Homma did not think that he could put much hope in this area.

However, the landing in Lamon Bay could not have come at a worse time from the U.S.-Philippine Army side (and the best time for the Japanese). The 41st Division, west of Batangas Bay, was already in position, but the 51st Division, which was assigned to defend the Bay of Lamon, was in the middle of a move, and a significant portion of it was divided toward Legazpi. The South Luzon Force had been reinforced by the 1st Regular Division during the last few days, of which only the 1st Regiment was actually on the

move in the area, and, moreover, its designated positions were quite dispersed.

Despite being unprepared for the situation, the U.S.-Philippine Force fiercely resisted, and the Japanese suffered heavy losses on their side. But by the night of the 24th, the 16th Division had forced the U.S.-Philippine Force to retreat, and the most difficult landing operation was a success. The news of this success came as "quite a surprise" to the HQ of 14th Army at Lingayen Gulf.

Plans for the withdrawal of North Luzon Force

WPO-3 was a well-established plan, and five lines of delay from D-1 to D-5 had been previously studied and selected for the withdrawal from Lingayen Gulf, which was thought to be the most likely place for the enemy to land, to the Bataan peninsula (D stands for Delaying Position). Each line was set at a distance that could be traveled in one night, taking advantage of defensible rivers, uplands, and villages to control the route across the central Luzon plain to Manila and the Bataan Peninsula.

D-1 was a line from Aguilar (5.34), south of Lingayen (5.35), to Urduyeta (10.34) via San Carlos (7.34), to the extent that it hoped to regroup troops disoriented by the fighting in Lingayen Gulf.

D-2 is the line behind the Agno River, one of the major natural barriers in the central Luzon plain, where it holds for a day before retreating to the D-3 Line: Santa Ignacia (8.29) – Gerona (10.29) – Guimba (13.31) - San Jose (17.32).

The D-4 was a line extending from Tarlac (11.28) to Cabanatuan (16.27) through La Paz (12.27), where the Pampanga River could be expected to be a major natural barrier before Cabanatuan.

D-5 was the Bamban (10.25) to Arayat Mountain (12.24) to Sibul Springs (17.24) line, with the Candaba Swamp in between, dividing the Central Luzon Plain into two corridors towards Manila. Only the last of these five lines, D-5, was considered a long-term line of defense, which was to be held until South Luzon force entered San Fernando (12.21) to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula.

But this was not a simple retreat battle, where you just need to back up while limiting the damage to your own units. The enemy's advance had to be delayed until the South Luzon Force's retreat to the Bataan Peninsula was assured, while North Luzon Force itself retreated with limited damage.

Major General Wainwright had to conduct this withdrawal with poorly trained and equipped Philippine Army Reserve Divisions, with little artillery and no air support. And even on the D-1 to D-5 line, there were not enough troops to hold the line itself. Only the already battered 26th Independent Cavalry Regiment of the Philippine Scouts and a handful of U.S. National Guard tank units were available to fill gaps in the defensive line or as a task force capable of covering the retreating units. As many as 13,000 Filipino soldiers tried to hide in the jungle or return to their families. Still, most Filipino soldiers persisted in this retreat to the end.

Major General Wainwright managed the operation despite the chaos. The troops fought bravely, retreating in five stages while destroying the railroad and the bridge, and the cover provided by the task force was well-timed and effective. Soldiers who had been defeated in the front line regrouped in the rear and rejoined the battle line. A military historian who studied the troop

redeployment operation in detail in later years described it as “brilliant.” On the American homeland, the retreat to Bataan helped boost national morale. On the Japanese side, the failure of the air force to achieve effective results in thwarting the U.S.-Philippine ground forces frustrated their leadership. The 14th Army continued to place top priority on the capture of Manila, particularly at the request of the Southern Army. The sluggish response of the 14th Army to information about the movement toward the Bataan Peninsula, being reported from the front lines, resulted in its missing the main Allied forces.

While Wainwright managed an excellent withdrawal, the U.S.-Philippine Army failed almost entirely to move the supplies that had been positioned near the planned front lines before the war began to the Bataan Peninsula. Due to the chaos of the battle, the scarcity of means of transport, or the ridiculous orders of higher command, large quantities of supplies fell into the hands of the Japanese. At Los Banos (20.10), the supply depot, once untouched and abandoned, was destroyed by troops arriving later in the very nick of time, while at Cabanatuan (16.27), 50 million bushels of rice, enough to feed the entire U.S.-Philippine forces for four or five years, were abandoned without being burned or moved. Large quantities of aviation fuel and parts were also left behind at Fort Stotsenburg (9.24). Had MacArthur ordered these supplies to be moved to the Bataan peninsula soon after 8 December, the subsequent battle on the Bataan peninsula in historical fact would have been quite different.

South Luzon Force

The situation for the South Luzon Force was not hopeless, but neither was it favorable. The central Luzon plain, where the North Luzon Force was located, had a plan to fall back to successive defensive lines that had been surveyed and set up in advance. The South Luzon Force had nothing similar prepared. Therefore, they had to improvise and set up defensive lines to take advantage of the terrain. Moreover, a second line would be set up behind it at the same time in case the first line was overtaken, and soldiers who had been defeated from the front line would be reorganized on the third line. If the South

Luzon Force withdrew too soon, the North Luzon Force would have to fight all the Japanese troops alone, and if the withdrawal was too slow, South Luzon Force would not be able to enter the Bataan Peninsula.

As it happened, the withdrawal of South Luzon Force was very successful. The destruction of roads and railroad bridges delayed the 16th Division's advance. The defensive line at Tiaong (22.07), which was holding its own, was abandoned by MacArthur's order on 29 December. MacArthur feared that the right flank of the D-4 line on the central Luzon plain would be breached, so he instructed South Luzon force to enter Manila as soon as possible and then proceed to the Bataan Peninsula via San Fernando (12.21). There was some dissatisfaction within the South Luzon Forces' command, but they obeyed MacArthur's orders, and all the troops began to move quickly.

In the evening of 31 December, the 16th Division captured Santo Tomas (19.09), and by the evening of 1 January it reached southern Manila.

The march of the 48th Division

At Lingayen Gulf, on the 24th, a high-ranking staff member of the 14th Army went to the headquarters of the 48th Division. He conveyed the Army's hesitancy about too rapid an advance and instructed them to refrain from pushing forward. Divisional commander, Lt. General Tsuchihashi's outlook was far more aggressive. He explained his view of the situation and said there was nothing to worry about, insisting on advancing toward the Agno River and not relenting his southward march.

The 48th Division's preliminary plan of advance was as follows:

1. Advance at once to the south bank of the Agno River and carefully prepare for the subsequent advance from this line.
2. In advancing from the Agno River, the focus was to capture the Tayug (13.35) - San Jose (17.32) road.
3. The Pampanga River should not be crossed at Cabanatuan (16.27), but preferably south of San Jose, far from the enemy.

4. Avoid the dispersal of forces under any circumstances.

After the 48th Division crossed the Agno River, frequent explosions could be heard frequently from the south as the U.S.-Philippine force destroyed bridges. As for the crossing of the Pampanga River, aerial reconnaissance had not determined if the road south of San Jose was clear, and Tsuchihashi decided to send only the 7th Tank Regiment in that direction while the main force of the 48th Division headed for Cabanatuan. There were several points where the river could be crossed around Cabanatuan, and since the front of the river was wide, he guessed that the enemy's defense would not be easy to overcome. Thinking it would be more advantageous to prepare as soon as possible, he gave the order to advance on the 27th without waiting for orders from the 14th Army.

The 14th Army still tried to stifle the advance on account of delays in landing equipment, and there was a constant disagreement with the 48th Division over the date of starting the advance from the line of the Agno River and whether the line to be paused should be at Cabanatuan or near Manila. A compromise of the two sides views was adopted, but the 48th Division strongly requested that the order be issued to advance to Manila in a timely manner. On 29 December, with the successful crossing of the Pampanga River south and east of Cabanatuan and little or no natural obstacles between that point and Manila, the 14th Army, finally persuaded by input from the 48th Division, agreed at midnight to advance to Manila. After the war (1946), interviews of the General Staff of the 14th Army at the time stated that "in comparison to the active courage of the division, the army was a little too meticulous and circumspect, and was inclined to restrain the division's actions unnecessarily."

Uejima Detached Force

The only regiment belonging to the 16th Division to land in Lingayen Gulf was the 9th Regiment (also called the Uejima Detached Force after Colonel Yoshio Uejima, the regiment's commander). It was assigned to occupy Naguilian Airfield (7.42) and control the southern coast of Lingayen

Gulf when it landed. Later, when the 48th Division was on its way to Cabanatuan (16.27), the Uejima Detachment Force was ordered to cover its right flank in order to facilitate its action and was to proceed to Tarlac (11.28) on the west side of the central Luzon plain and to San Fernando (12.21) beyond.

On the 27th, an aerial reconnaissance revealed that the U.S.-Philippine Army intended to withdraw their entire force to the Bataan Peninsula, and the 14th Army Staff met to discuss future operational guidance. The agenda was whether to concentrate all efforts on the Manila offensive as originally planned, or to direct all or part of the ground and air forces against the U.S.-Philippine forces in retreat toward the Bataan Peninsula. Both proposals were discussed, but it was decided that it was not possible to divert forces from the attack on Manila. They also learned that Manila had been declared an Open City according to the San Francisco Broadcasting Corporation, but contradictory information obtained from Manila agents indicated that military action was still being conducted there. Therefore, by the decision of Commander-in-Chief Homma, it was decided to focus their main force on Manila.


As a result, only the 9th Regiment was tasked with holding San Fernando, which would be crucial to the U.S.-Philippine withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula. The 9th Regiment had suffered considerable losses by now, its forces were dispersed, and it had few vehicles.

Nevertheless, regimental commander Uejima continued to pedal at the front of the line with as many bicycle units as possible, "with the spearhead alone being as fast as the 48th Division" and although they dared to attack and successfully occupy Tarlac (11.28) at an astonishingly fast pace, Uejima was killed in a fierce firefight while at the head of his troops.

The Bridges of Calumpit

The key to the success of the U.S.-Philippine Force withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula was the ability to hold Baliuag (15.21) and Plaridel (15.20). If this area was overtaken by the Japanese, it would be impossible for the Southern Luzon forces to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula. MacArthur ordered all available troops to be placed in the vicinity, and part of the 51st Division and the 194th Tank Battalion from the South Luzon Force also rushed to the area. The 71st Division, defending Baliuag, had suffered heavy losses, and Major General Wainwright turned to the 91st Division to reinforce it.

The Japanese 7th Tank Regiment reached Baliuag in the early morning of 31 December. The Japanese temporarily retreated after encountering determined resistance, but at noon on the 31st, they reassembled their forces and began a ferocious attack. The U.S.-Philippine Army hurriedly sent in a tank unit. The Philippine troops bombarded and supported them; and the M3 Stuarts fought a tank battle with Japanese tanks, destroying eight Japanese



Calumpit Bridges spanning the Pampanga River (hex side 13.20/13.21)

tanks and forcing them to retreat with no damage of their own. Eventually, the U.S.-Philippine Army managed to withdraw all of their troops and continue towards Bataan.

The next Japanese focal point was the Calumpit Bridge over the Pampanga River. At 5 a.m. on January 1, 1942, all troops crossed to the west side of the river. Major General Wainwright ordered the Calumpit Bridge (13.20) to be blown up at 6:15 am. Although many bridges, large and small, had been blown up during the campaign, the Japanese had made use of a variety of means to advance without suffering any significant impact on the speed of their offensive. The destruction of the Calumpit Bridge had the greatest impact on them. However, of the three large bridges at the Calumpit, one was destroyed, and two were severely damaged, allowing the Japanese to advance to the West Bank after a slight delay following repairs by the engineers and other factors.

Occupation of Manila

The Japanese troops were closing in on Manila from the north and south, on 1 January, the occupation of the city was just around the corner. Although the 48th Division could enter Manila that day, the agreement before the war began stated that the 48th and 16th Divisions would enter the city at the same time to avoid a competition for merit, and the 14th Army Command carefully controlled the advance of the front-line troops, fearing that the city would be affected by the war. Therefore, on the same day, General Staff Maki from the 14th Army came to reiterate Commander Homma's intention to wait to enter Manila.

At this time, there was this exchange between Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi, commander of the 48th Division, and General Staff Maki:

Tsuchihashi: "We finally let the enemy escape to Bataan because I voiced my opinion so many times and the army (the 14th) ignored it."

Maki: "No, my lord, don't worry about it. They won't be able to resist for long if they run into Bataan. They are no better than rats in a sack, and we can crush them without much trouble."

Tsuchihashi: "You're an honors student at the Army War College and you say some strange things. Maybe they are rats in a sack, and we can easily beat them, but by tactics, we should annihilate them at the drop of a hat (easily). We had a great opportunity to destroy them on the east side of the Pampanga River, you let them get away without taking any action. But you say, no, we'll do it on Bataan. What the hell!?"

On the following day, January 2, Chief of Staff Maeda of the 14th Army brought many small rice cakes for the New Year, but again Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi accused the army of letting the enemy escape to Bataan and asked, "Why doesn't the Army order me to go to Bataan?"

To this Chief of Staff Maeda replied: "Yes, that is what Commander Homma wants. But he said that since the 48th Division's mission was to occupy Manila and to prepare for the Java operation, Tsuchihashi wouldn't be able to accept my request." This was partly due to Lieutenant General Homma's naturally kind and reserved nature. At the same time, it was Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi, who was a close friend of Lieutenant General Homma from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy days, who was in charge of the Java Operation planned to include the 48th Division, and it is assumed that he paid careful attention to this.

When Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi heard this, he was surprised. "What constraints? This is a battlefield. This is not the time for such nonsense, if necessary. Very well. I'll give the order and go to Bataan. But that won't be long, since we have to prepare for the next battle in Java. Just one week and we'll go as far as we can go."

He immediately ordered the 48th Division to proceed to Bataan.

Parts of the 48th Division and units of the 16th Division marched into Manila on January 1 and 2, to an icy reception by Filipinos watching the march. High-ranking Japanese officers who inspected the situation in Manila were disappointed, even though they also hoped that the Japanese would be hailed as liberators from American rule.

However, when Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu saw a propaganda leaflet in the early days of the war, saying that the purpose of the Japanese army was to liberate the Philippine islands from the oppression and exploitation of the United States, he was very grumpy and angry, and said, "When did the U.S. exploit the Philippine Islands? Rather than oppressing them, the U.S. was giving them good government. The Filipinos will only despise us if we write such nonsense. The difficulty lies in the fact that we have to do more good than the U.S., and you have to work for it."

To the Bataan Peninsula

Within the Bataan peninsula, the U.S.-Philippine Forces which had reached the area were regrouping for future battles. In order to buy time, Major General Wainwright decided to conduct a last delaying battle on the Porac and Guagua lines. The 11th and 21st Divisions, plus a tank unit, were in the front line, with the 26th Cavalry Regiment in the rear as a reserve.

On 2 January, the 48th Division assembled all but the troops left in Manila at San Fernando (12.21) and launched an attack, but the U.S.-Philippine Force resisted stubbornly. The 21st Division even made a counterattack plan, but this was cancelled as night fell. The next day the Japanese launched a fierce attack, accompanied by heavy artillery and aircraft support. The 21st Division had been ordered to "defend the present front line desperately," but the Japanese broke through the line and nearly captured the entire staff of the division.

On January 5, the Japanese advanced to Santa Cruz (10.20) and defeated the U.S.-Philippine Force with tanks and artillery. They occupied Dinalupihan (8.19) the evening of January 6, and in the early morning of January 7, they occupied Hermosa (9.19) without much resistance from their night attack.

But this was the limit. The 48th Division's momentum was waning, and above all, it had to withdraw quickly because the Java operation had been accelerated. Therefore, the attack on the U.S.-Philippine Army on

the Bataan Peninsula was temporarily halted on 7 January. As for the 14th Army, the 48th Division had the goal of advancing to Balanga (10.17) and Olongapo (6.19), but the resistance of the U.S.-Philippine forces was unexpectedly strong, and they did not reach this goal.

The Japanese seriously underestimated the size of the enemy forces in the Bataan Peninsula. The staff of the 14th Army, including Lieutenant General Homma, were still optimistic about the coming battle for Bataan. The 65th Brigade, which came in exchange for the 48th Division, would enter the Bataan Peninsula after 8 January, and it was expected that the cleanup operation would be completed soon. However, the U.S.-Philippine forces had made preparations for the war within the Bataan peninsula to a considerable degree, although the U.S.-Philippine Army in turn mistakenly believed that the Japanese forces were much larger. The battle on the Bataan Peninsula eventually lasted until April 7 and became a “symbol of resistance” for the Allies. Moreover, it would be another month after that before Corregidor and all four surrounding islands fell and the port of Manila became available to the Japanese. Corregidor finally surrendered at the same time as the Battle of the Coral Sea, when advancing Japanese forces were stymied for the first time.

Bibliography

Books which cover the war in the Philippines from 1941 to 1942:

“The Fall of the Philippines 1941-42” by Clayton Chun. This is a book in the Osprey Campaign Series, with plenty of maps and photos. It is a great first read.

“The Fall of the Philippines” by Louis Morton, part of the United States Army in World War II Series. An excellent and very detailed book dealing with this battle, and available on the web at https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_Content.htm#part3



“The Times When Men Must Die: The Story of the Destruction of the Philippine Army During the Early Months of World War II in the Pacific, December 1941-May 1942” by Marconi M. Dioso. Although the book focuses on the Philippine Army, it also deals with a good balance of political stories and the movements of the Japanese and American troops. There are many detailed and interesting episodes, and I highly recommend this book to you.

“Fall of the Philippines” by Ward Rutherford, Japanese version is “Nihon-gun Manila Senryou: Gekitou! Philippine Kouryaku-sen”. This is a copy of Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II. The maps and photographs are wonderful, and the text is very realistic.

“Luson Tou Shinkou Sakusen (Invasion of Luzon Island)” by Rikusen shi Kenkyu Hukyuu kai. The book is in Japanese and provides a compact overview of this battle. It includes 6 large maps. If you want to read about this battle in Japanese, this is the book to start with.

“Hitou Kouryaku Sakusen (Operation Philippine Islands)” by Bouei Chou Bouei Kenkyu-sitsu Senshi-sitsu. This is a detailed book on the battle in Japanese. It comes with a large number of very large maps and tables and is a must read if you want detailed information on the Japanese side of the battle.

“Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, Volume I: July 1937-May 1942: A History of the Asia-Pacific War: July

1937-May 1942” by Richard B. Frank, 2020, W. W. Norton & Co., New York.

Books on General MacArthur:

“MacArthur: Biography of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur” S. L. Mayer, Japanese version is “MacArthur: Tokyo heno nagai michi”. This is a copy of Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II. There is no map, but the book is well organized.

“MacArthur” by Clay Blair, Jr, Japanese version is “MacArthur Sono Eikou to Zasetu”. This is a biography of MacArthur's character, compiled from a journalistic perspective.

“American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964” by William Manchester, Japanese version is “Douglas MacArthur”. This is a very detailed book covering MacArthur's life and contains considerable description of this battle.

“A Trial of Generals” by Lawrence Taylor, Japanese version is “Shougun no Saiban: MacArthur no Hukushu”. MacArthur fought in the Philippines first against General Homma Masaharu and then against General Yamashita Tomoyuki. This book is about those battles and the subsequent trials.

Books on General Wainwright:

“General Wainwright's Story” by Jonathan M. Wainwright. General Wainwright's autobiography doesn't contain a lot of descriptions of time this game deals with, but it is an inspiring book.

“MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines” by John Jacob Beck. There is no mention at all of combat during the period the game deals with, and it describes MacArthur's interactions with the U.S. mainland. However, it is informative about the subsequent relationship between the two sides on the Bataan Peninsula and elsewhere.

Books on General Homma Masaharu:

“Issai Yume ni Goza sourou: Homma Masaharu Chujou Den (It's all a dream: Biography of Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu)” by Tsunoda Husako. This is a

very detailed biographical book written about Homma Masaharu. It clearly shows that Homma was too kind of a character to be a soldier.

“Four Samurai: A Quartet of Japanese Army Commanders in the Second World War” by Arthur Swinson, Japanese version is “Yo-nin no Samurai”. This is a book of biographies on Homma Masaharu, Mutaguchi Renya, Yamashita Tomoyuki and Honda Masaki, written by a British journalist who had fought against the Japanese in Kohima.

Book on General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu:

“Gunpuku Seikatsu Yon-ju-nen no Omoide (Memories of 40 years in uniform)” by Tsuchihashi Yuuitsu. This is an autobiography written by General Tsuchihashi himself. You can also read more about the period of time before and after this game.

Electronic materials:

There are many great maps on Wikipedia that are Public Domain. Searching for “Category: Maps of the Battle of the Philippines (1941-42)” will take you to many of them. The following pages are also recommended.

Lingayen Gulf

Japanese invasion of Lingayen Gulf

Japanese invasion of Lamon Bay

149th Armored Regiment

Philippines campaign (1941-1942)

“Manila: How Open Was This Open City?” <https://www.historynet.com/manila-how-open-was-this-open-city-january-98-world-war-ii-feature.htm> You can read an analysis of what Manila was like when it became an Open City.

Abbreviations

- Ann - Mitsubishi Ki-30
- Eng - Engineer
- For - Formosa (Taiwan)

- H - Heavy Artillery
- Lily - Kawasaki Ki-48
- Nate - Nakajima Ki-27
- NLF - North Luzon Force
- Phil - Philippine Division
- Res - Reserve Force
- Recon - Reconnaissance
- SNF - South Luzon Force

Luzon Contents

A complete game should contain:

- Exclusive Rules (in the magazine)
- Countersheet (140 counters)
- Game Map (22x34)

Note: the OCS Series Rulebook and Charts are not included. These can be downloaded from the MMP Game Support site (listed below).

Contact Information:

To order other games from MMP, visit:

<http://www.mmpgamers.com/>

For game errata and downloads, visit:

<https://mmpgamers.com/operational-combat-series-support-ezp-14>

To chat about OCS and obtain speedy answers to your rule questions, visit <http://www.consimworld.com/>

To contact the developer, email:

csaltsman0914@gmail.com